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RESOLVING CONSUMER
GRIEVANCES IN A MANAGED
CARE ENVIRONMENT
Eleanor D. Kinney, J.D., M.P.H.*
I. INTRODUCTION
ONE MUST COME TO THE SUBJECT of resolving con-
sumer grievances in a managed care environment with deep
concern that many forces are at work today to disempower con-
sumers in their ability to influence the content and quality of the
health care services they receive. Specifically, the number of un-
insured Americans continues to increase, from thirty-seven mil-
lion in the late 1980s' to over forty million in 1995.2 The num-
ber of Americans insured under employer-sponsored health plans
has decreased ten percent since 1980 as employers attempted to
control their exposure to the escalating costs of employee health
care.3 Indeed, the trend in health insurance coverage since 1980
has been to reduce the number of covered individuals, to limit
benefits and their coverage, to constrain the choice of providers
and services, and to increase individual responsibility for health
costs. 4 The nation's public hospitals that serve the uninsured are
threatened with closure as states and the federal government seek
to curtail Medicare and Medicaid program expenditures.5 Further,
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malpractice reform bills before the 104th Congress would se-
verely limit the ability of plaintiffs to recover for serious medical
injuries, or even to get to court to press claims for poor quality,
injurious medical care.6
Help in the form of government-sponsored health reform is
not forthcoming in the foreseeable future. Systemic health reform
at the federal level is not in the offing given the failure of Con-
gress to adopt health reform in the 103d Congress and the lack
of interest in comprehensive health reform in the 104th Con-
gress. Further, state efforts toward genuine health reform, while
holding much promise, have not been universally implemented or
sustainable over time.7 It is thus especially important to address
the issue of consumer grievance resolution in managed care
plans, particularly in the current environment of failed health
care reform and powerful and effective private moves toward
competitive, lower-cost managed care systems.
The health care industry is indeed reorganizing itself at a
frenetic pace. Hospitals, physicians, and insurers are engaged in
corporate restructuring efforts to develop networks that will max-
imize revenues for network sponsors. The major mechanism for
maximizing such revenues is so-called managed care, in which
the cost and utilization of health care services are carefully con-
trolled. Other than utilization review and contract limits on
choice and costs, the major means by which care is "managed"
is by assigning the risk of excess cost and utilization to the prov-
iders directly responsible for providing care to plan members,
thereby motivating these providers to limit the care provided.
While consistent with theories of competition as an effective
means of controlling health care costs, 8 the upshot of these
mechanisms may be to limit the ability of consumers to select
both the health care they receive and the providers from whom
they receive it.
Aug. 20, 1995, at Al.
6. See Jennifer O'Sullivan, Congressional Research Serv., in MEDICAL MALRACrICE 10
(1995). See Eleanor D. Kinney, Malpractice Reform in the 1990s: Past Disappointments, Fu-
ture Success?, 20 J. HALTH PoL PoL'Y & L. 99 (1995) (reviewing malpractice reform pro-
posals before the 103d Congress).
7. COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INSURANCE. HEALTH CARE REFORM IN THE
STATES, 1995 (1995) (discussing state government's efforts to create innovative health care
systems).
8. Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, 12 HATH
AF., Supp. 1993, at 24.
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This Article addresses how patient grievances can be pre-
vented and/or resolved in public and private managed care plans.
First, the Article describes the development of managed care
plans in the American health care system and the profound
changes in the relationships between patients and physicians in
managed care plans. Here, the Article explores the implications
of these developments for the prevention and resolution of pa-
tient grievances. Second, the Article reviews the existing legal
rules that currently govern the resolution of disputes in the health
care system as well as the deficiencies of those legal rules for
protecting patients with grievances in managed care settings.
Third, the Article addresses the critical issues in designing griev-
ance and appeal procedures for resolving disputes among pa-
tients, physicians, and managed care plans. Finally, the Article
suggests approaches for reducing grievances in managed care set-
tings - ultimately the most effective means of addressing the
real needs of patients and their physicians.
II. THE PHENOMENON OF MANAGED CARE
A. Historical Development
Managed care is a broad term that connotes efforts by spon-
sors of health insurance plans and health maintenance organiza-
tions (HMOs) to "manage" the care provided to plan members
in order to avoid unnecessary utilization of services and thereby
contain expenditures and maximize revenues. Managed care is
best understood as an effort to reform the traditional fee-for-
service system in which the patient selects a physician; the phy-
sician provides or orders the care that, according to the best
medical judgment, the physician believes to be appropriate; and
the insurer passively pays the resulting bills for the care. Man-
aged care is predicated on the assumption that this system is im-
perfect because physicians and other providers who are paid for
the care have inappropriate incentives to order or provide argua-
bly unnecessary services and to overcharge for the services that
they do provide.
The reform of the incentives in the traditional fee-for-ser-
vice system has been the predominant cost containment strategy
for the last thirty years, following the advent of the Medicare
and Medicaid programs in 1965. These programs adopted the
fee-for-service system hook, line, and sinker. As a result, they
149Wmter 1996]
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experienced tremendous inflation in program expenditures. 9 It is
important to understand that Congress incorporated the traditional
fee-for-service approach into the Medicare program out of fear
that physicians would not participate in the programs if there
were other payment arrangements.' 0 Moreover, the Supplemen-
tary Medical Insurance Program (Part B)" was based on a health
insurance proposal developed by the American Medical
Association.'2
Early reform efforts looked to the experience of existing
HMOs, which were financed through pre-paid monthly fees from
members and bore the risk of providing care to plan members.
Specifically, HMOs had lower hospital utilization rates, offered
more preventive services, and appeared to provide quality care in
a more cost-effective manner.13 In 1972, Congress enacted the
federal HMO Act in an effort to promote the development of
HMOs nationwide.' 4
The move to managed care in the 1980s was primarily a
private effort by health insurers and their major customers -
employers - to control escalating health care costs. The Carter
Administration's efforts to enact national health insurance had
failed. The Reagan Administration was promoting competition
and the private payers' move to managed care was seen as a
positive outcome of competition. The 1980s witnessed the expan-
sion of HMOs and the development of preferred provider organi-
zations (PPOs) through which payers contracted with providers
for services at lower costs in return for a guaranteed volume of
patients.
Managed care received a boost with President Clinton's de-
cision to adopt managed competition as the major strategy for
9. Marian Gomick et al., Twenty Years of Medicare and Medicaid: Covered Popula-
tions, Use of Benefits, and Program Expenditures, HEALTH CARE FN. RE v., Supp. 1985, 13,
42-45.
10. See ROBERT . MYERS. MEDICARE 1 (1970) (reviewing the legislative history of the
Medicare program and the compromises with the provider community that influenced Medi-
care program design); JutDrr M. FEDER, MEDIcARE. THE PoLmncs OF FEDERAL HOsPITAL IN-
sutANcE 1 (1977) (reviewing the rationale for the basic design of the Medicare program).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395(w) (1994).
12. MYERS, supra note 10, at 51-72.
13. See, e.g., Sheldon Greenfield et al., Variations in Resource Utilization Among Medi-
cal Specialties and Systems of Care: Results from the Medical Outcomes Study, 267 JAMA
1624 (1992) (reporting study findings that HMOs have hospitalization rates that are 40% be-
low fee-for-service plans).
14. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1994).
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health reform in his proposal for comprehensive health care re-
form in 1993.' With federally mandated health reform appar-
ently in the offing, providers and payers created a variety of
managed care networks that could compete effectively under the
reformed system.' 6 Even with the failure of federally mandated
health reform, providers and payers have continued this trend as
they scramble to compete effectively in the relatively unregulated
health care market of the present day. The upshot of these devel-
opments is that Americans are increasingly likely to receive their
health care services through managed health plans.
B. Managed Care and the Relationships Between Patients,
Physicians, and Plans
Perhaps the most important feature of managed care plans,
particularly from the perspective of the physician-patient relation-
ship, is the confluence of the functions of providing and paying
for health care services. Under many managed care plans, espe-
cially the most integrated plans, there has been a fairly consistent
pattern of fusion of the traditionally independent roles of provid-
ing care and paying for care. This fusion has crucial implications
for the physician-patient relationship and also for the develop-
ment and resolution of patient grievances.
Specifically, the role of physicians and their relationships to
patients and patients' health plans are different in managed care
settings than in the traditional fee-for-service environment. These
changes, which make the relationship between physicians and
their patients more indirect financially and to some extent, even
clinically, are perhaps the most important changes wrought by
managed care from the perspective of both patients and their
physicians. At the heart of the changes is the ability and inclina-
tion of physicians to perform their crucial patient advocacy func-
tion. In the past, physicians as patient advocates felt obliged to
seek the highest quality care for their patients in the absolute
sense, almost independent of other considerations. 7 There is
some question whether physicians feel this obligation as in-
15. H.R. 3600, Health Security Act of 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session (1993).
16. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Health Industry is Moving to Form Service Networks, N.Y.
Tims, Aug. 21, 1993, at Al.
17. See Avedis Donabedian, Quality, Cost, and Clinical Decisions, 468 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL & SOc SCi. 196, 199-204 (1983).
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tensely today when operating under incentives to constrain re-
sources and, thus medical care, to individual patients.
The changes in the relationship among physicians, their pa-
tients, and the patients' health plans, can be placed on a contin-
uum. At one end of the continuum is the direct relationship be-
tween the physician and the patient. The patient is insured under
a traditional indemnity insurance plan and the physician has no
legal relationship to the patient's health plan. The contractual re-
lationships are between the patient and the physician and the pa-
tient and the plan. The patient is obligated to pay the physician a
fee for service rendered. The plan is obligated to indemnify the
patient for medical expenditures incurred according to the terms
of the insurance contract. Patients may and often do "assign"
their rights to providers to collect payment from the plan.
At the other end of the continuum are more integrated man-
aged care networks in which physicians have a contractual rela-
tionship with the plan and may indeed be the plan's employees.
The legal relationship between the patient and the physician is
more elusive. The patient, or an employer, union, or other payor
on the patient's behalf, contracts with the plan and not with the
physician for health care services. The physician, as the em-
ployee of or contractor with the plan, then provides health care
services to the patient on behalf of the plan. Ostensibly, the pa-
tient has no contractual relationship with the physician, although,
of course, the physician's obligations in tort remain.
The points on the continuum between these poles are also
instructive. They include various types of HMOs, such as the
group model HMO in which physician groups provide services
to HMO members pursuant to a contract with the HMO, and the
independent practice association (IPA) in which the HMO con-
tracts with individual physicians. More recently, payor- and pro-
vider-sponsored networks have been organizing physicians to
provide medical care. The predominant model for the organiza-
tion of physicians in these networks is the physician-hospital or-
ganization (PHO), in which hospitals and their medical staffs
bear the risk of care to network patients. Near the other end of
the continuum, PPOs impose some restrictions on physicians,
such as utilization review and cost constraints, in return for guar-
anteed patients.
An important confounding variable in all of these organiza-
tional arrangements is the extent to which the physician shares in
the risk of the cost of caring for patients and the profit of excess
[Vol. 6:147
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revenues from the care of patients. To the extent that physicians
participate in the distribution of these excess revenues and bear
some of the risk for their loss, whether in a for-profit or not-for-
profit structure, they have a financial interest in limiting care to
patients. This financial interest may pose ethical issues for physi-
cians in the determination of care for these plan patients.18
Further, these issues are essentially the same regardless
whether the corporate control of the organization is for-profit,
not-for-profit, tax-exempt, or not-for-profit. The corporate control
arrangements simply dictate where the excess revenues over ex-
penses go. They do not directly address the relationship between
the patient and physician.
In any event, that obligations follow payment is indisputa-
ble.19 Once the functions of providing and paying for care are
fused, as is the case under many, if not most, managed care ar-
rangements, then changes in the physician-patient relationship in-
evitably result. First, the physician now owes duties as contractor
and/or employee to the plan. Second, the physician often has no
real economic relationship to the patient, but rather, has an eco-
nomic relationship chiefly to the plan and its sponsor. In some
cases the plan rather than the patient selects the patient's physi-
cian, and in nearly all plans, constrains the choice of physicians
available to the patient.
What is the impact of these changes on the physician's loy-
alty to the patient and the physician's function as the patient's
advocate for care irrespective of cost or other constraints? It
seems inevitable that the physician's traditional role of patient
advocate for high quality care regardless of other considerations
would be compromised.20 Physicians now owe some loyalty to or
at least are influenced by the corporate plans in which they prac-
tice. Maybe the American Medical Association was on to some-
thing in 1912 when it issued its first ethical canon on the corpo-
rate practice of medicine.2' Historically, the medical profession
18. See David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-Physician Relationship,
5 HEALTH MATxX 141 (1995).
19. See Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332 NEw ENG. J. MED. 604
(1995).
20. See generally Carl H. Hitchner et al., Integrated Delivery Systems: A Survey of Or-
ganizational Models, 29 WAKE FoGSr L REv. 273 (1994) (describing the different organiza-
tional models for integrated delivery systems along the continuum described in this Article).
21. See Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An
Anachronism in the Modem Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REv. 445, 459-462 (1995)
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and its representatives have opposed practice settings in which
physicians provided services where patients were not directly re-
sponsible for payment for the specific service rendered.22
Ifl. CURRENT LEGAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION
OF GRIEVANCES
There are several, often conflicting, sets of state and federal
legal rules that now govern the adjudication of grievances in
managed care settings.23 Which set of legal rules applies in a
given situation depends on two major factors: (1) the sponsor of
the plan; and (2) the nature of the dispute.
A. The Sponsor of the Plan
1. Government Programs
If the sponsor of the plan is the government, as is the case
for Medicare and Medicaid, then the procedural due process
guarantees of the Federal Constitution apply.24 Procedural due
process requires public health insurance programs to provide ad-
ministrative hearing opportunities to beneficiaries who have dis-
putes with the plan and adequate notice of plan decisions giving
rise to such disputes35
For the Medicare program, Congress has mandated hearing
procedures for patient disputes generally.26 Congress also speci-
fied that hearing procedures be provided to patients of Medicare
HMOs.27 For the Medicaid program, Congress simply required
(recounting the history of the AMA's ethical position on the corporate practice of medicine).
22. Id. at 445. See also Sheva J. Sanders, Regulating Managed Care Plans under Cur-
rent Law: A Radical Reversion to Established Doctrine, 20 HoPsTRA L REV. 73 (1991) (re-
viewing the corporate practice of medicine doctrine in the United States which proscribed
corporate ownership of medical practice and corporate employment of physicians).
23. See generally Eleanor D. Kinney, Protecting Consumers and Providers Under
Health Reform: An Overview of the Major Administrative Law Issues, 5 HAT MATRIX 83
(1995) (discussing adjudicative procedures at both the state and federal level).
24. Id. at 89-91.
25. For a classical discussion of procedural process requirements for administrative
hearings, see Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L REv. 1267 (1975).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (1994). See Kinney, supra note 23, at 99-103; Eleanor D. Kin-
ney, The Medicare Appeals System for Coverage and Payment Disputes: Achieving Fairness
in a Time of Constraint, I ADMIN. L. J. 1 (1987).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(c)(5) (1994); 42 C.F.R. §§ 417.600-.638 (1996). See Kinney,
supra note 23, at 100; Susan J. Stayn, Securing Access to Care in Health Maintenance Orga-
nizations: Toward a Uniform Model of Grievance and Appeal Procedures, 94 COLUM L REv.
1674, 1691-92 (1994).
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the states to provide opportunities for fair hearings which meet
federal constitutional due process requirements.28 Federal regula-
tions require Medicaid HMOs to maintain "an internal grievance
procedure" which provides for prompt resolution of disputes,
and "the participation of individuals with authority to require
corrective action." 29 Otherwise, Medicaid HMO members use the
state's fair hearing procedures for all Medicaid disputes.30
2. Private Health Plans
There are two basic sets of legal rules that apply to griev-
ance procedures in private health plans: (1) state tort and con-
tract law; and (2) the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA).31 The definitive factor in determining which
set of rules applies is whether or not the health plan is an "em-
ployee welfare benefit plan" under ERISA. 32 In the event that it
is an "employee welfare plan," then ERISA preempts state laws,
including state insurance codes that might otherwise regulate em-
ployee benefit plans.33
Generally, a self-insured employee health plan clearly will
fall under the ERISA preemption and be subject to ERISA re-
quirements. However, if the employer purchases health insurance
from a commercial insurance company, aspects of the health plan
that relate to the business of insurance may be regulated by state
insurance laws.34 The extent of the ERISA preemption has been
controversial, as has the fact that it insulates employee benefit
plans, particularly those which are self-insured, from the con-
sumer protections under state insurance codes that customarily
regulate commercial health insurance plans, Blue Cross and Blue
Shield plans, and HMOs. 35 For self-insured employee health
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (1994); 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.200-.250 (1993).
29. 42 C.F.R. § 434.32(c) (1994). See Kinney, supra note 23, at 103.
30. See Stayn, supra note 27, at 1701-08 (noting weak structural protections in many
states for non-Medicare enrollees with grievances).
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1461 (1994).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994) (defining employee welfare benefit plans).
33. Id. § 1144.
34. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A); see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987)
(ordering removal to federal court where suit was not based on a law regulating insurance but
based on laws pre-empted by ERISA); Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41
(1987) (noting that laws regulating insurance are excepted from pre-emption clause laws).
35. See, e.g., Mary A. Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing Health
Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAvis L. Rev. 255 (1990); Alan I. Widiss & Larry
Gostin, What's Wrong with the ERISA "Vacuum?:" The Case Against Unrestricted Freedom
W'miter 1996]
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plans, ERISA sets forth the procedures for resolving grievances.3 6
These ERISA procedures do not specifically address disputes that
arise in capitated systems outside the context of claims related to
payments for fee for services.37
For health plans subject to regulation under state insurance
codes, the codes do apply along with principles of state contract
and tort law. For conventional health plans regulated under state
law, consumer disputes are generally adjudicated in state courts
as matters of state contract law as modified by state statutory
and common laws governing insurance. 38 In recent years, the
emerging common law tort theory of bad faith breach of contract
has become an important basis for recovery against state-
regulated health plans that fail to pay claims.39 It should be noted
that the Supreme Court has ruled that recovery of damages on
this theory is not available for disputes with any employee bene-
fit plans regulated under ERISA 0
States also specifically regulate HMOs with statutes setting
forth requirements for HMOs offering services within the state.41
Most of these statutes require HMOs to maintain internal griev-
ance procedures for consumers. 42 Further, most states require
HMOs to advise consumers of these procedures upon enrollment
or even upon material changes in the benefit package offered by
the HMO. 43 However, if the HMO is a self-insured employee
benefit plan regulated under ERISA, these protections under state
law do not apply.
for Employers to Terminate Employee Health Care Plans and to Decide What Coverage is to
be Provided When Risk Retention Plans are Established for Health Care, 41 DRAKE L Rav.
635 (1992) (discussing ERISA's preemption of many state attempts at regulating employee
health plans).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994). See Kinney, supra note 23, at 96-98.
37. Kinney, supra note 23, at 96-99.
38. Id. at 96, n.55.
39. Id. at 96, n.56.
40. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 52-54 (1987).
41. See Barbara A. Shickich, Legal Characteristics of the Health Maintenance Organi-
zation, in HEALTHCARE FACILITIES LAW: CRrriCAL IsSUES FOR HosPrrALS, HMOs, AND Ex-
TENDED CARE FACILITIES § 16.9, at 1079-81 & n.l (Anne M. Dellinger ed., 1991) (listing state
statutes regulating HMOs).
42. Stayn, supra note 27, at 1703 n.203 (listing applicable state statutes).
43. Id. at 1704 n.206 (listing applicable state statutes).
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B. The Nature of the Dispute
The other distinguishing factor in determining applicable le-
gal rules for adjudicating disputes under current law is the nature
of the issues in dispute. Disputes between consumers and their
providers and payers fall under four substantive areas: (1) eligi-
bility for services; (2) the amount of payment for services; (3)
coverage of services; and (4) poor quality of services resulting in
medical injury.
Under traditional fee-for-service plans, the legal rules for
the disposition of disputes in each of these substantive areas are
quite distinct. Claims in the first three categories, such as eligi-
bility, payment, and coverage of services, are adjudicated as
claims against the health plan in the applicable appeals systems
outlined above." Tort claims for bad faith breach on the part of
a payor or plan also exist for egregious conduct resulting in the
denial of payment or coverage in the case of state-regulated, pri-
vate insurance, and HMO plans.45 Claims regarding quality of
services that result in medical injury are resolved in state com-
mon law tort systems under principles of medical malpractice
law.
Historically, patient grievances with both private and public
health insurance programs have centered primarily around pay-
ment for and coverage of services. These issues also arose in the
context of a "claim." Quality disputes based on negligence, for
example medical malpractice, are completely distinguishable and
handled independently in the common law tort system. Only to
the extent that the payor was also at risk for providing services,
as in an HMO, did the patient have grievances with the plan
about the quality of services.
However, as a result of the confluence of the provision and
payment of services in many managed care plans, the legal sys-
tems for adjudicating disputes under these plans now overlap.
The old legal authorities for resolving grievances between pa-
tients and their physicians and payors have not kept pace with
the emerging models of providing and paying for care or the re-
sulting reconfiguration of issues giving rise to grievances.
The major problem with the confluence of providing and
paying for health care in managed care plans pertains to cover-
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994).
45. Id.
W'mter 1996]
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age decisions. Specifically, under traditional payment arrange-
ments in which payors paid for all service ordered unless specifi-
cally not covered, coverage disputes were generally clearly
delineated. For one reason, the physician, as the patient's advo-
cate, would order a service and the payer would refuse to pay
for it on grounds that it was not covered under the plan. This re-
fusal constituted a distinct event that triggered the appeal. But
now, many managed care plans impose financial or other incen-
tives on physicians not to order services, so the physician may
simply determine not to provide a service to a patient, often
without indicating that the service is ostensibly available in the
arsenal of medical treatment modalities. The patient does not
know that a coverage determination has been made or that an ap-
pealable event has occurred.
Other anomalies are present with the confluence of provid-
ing and paying for care. Perhaps no other legal development ex-
emplifies the untoward implications of the confluence of provid-
ing and paying for care than the treatment of malpractice claims
against ERISA-regulated health plans. In recent years, patients
who have sued ERISA-regulated managed care plans have often
encountered court decisions ruling that their common law mal-
practice claims against plans are preempted by ERISA and state
common law remedies against the plan are, therefore, unavaila-
ble.46 Generally, only those claims that involve plan supervision
of medical care which result in physical injury as well as claims
directed at plan physicians for medical negligence are pre-
empted.47 Most courts have preempted under ERISA tort claims
aimed at plan cost containment policies. 48 Then, the extension of
tort liability to managed care plans and the appropriate range of
the ERISA preemption remain controversial. 49
For purposes of designing systems to resolve grievances, the
confluence of paying for and providing services within a plan
46. See William A. Chittenden Il1, Malpractice Liability and Managed Health Care:
History and Prognosis, 26 TORT & INS. U. 451, 485-92 (1991) (describing cases in which
courts ruled that ERISA preempted medical malpractice and other state tort claims against
managed care plans).
47. Id. at 489-92.
48. Id. at 487-88.
49. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Frankel, Note, Medical Malpractice Law and Health Care
Cost Containment: Lessons for Reformers from the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE L. J. 1297,
1311 (1994); Helene L. Parise, Comment, The Proper Extension of Tort Liability Principles
in the Managed Care Industry, 64 TaMe. L. REv. 977, 1003 (1991).
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profoundly changes the appeals process. In a managed care plan,
the crucial action defining the appealable event becomes the
clinical decision of the physician regarding the amount, duration,
and scope of services provided to the patient. When the clinical
decision becomes the appealable event, it is difficult to distin-
guish a coverage dispute from a quality dispute giving rise to a
medical malpractice claim. Indeed, as a result of the fusion of
providing and paying for care, malpractice and claims for cover-
age of or payment for medical services, once independent deci-
sions, now overlap. In designing grievance procedures and ap-
peals systems for managed care plans, it is crucial to address
these ramifications of the confluence of providing and paying for
care that now confront patients as they protect their interest in
receiving quality care from these plans.
IV. RESOLVING GRIEVANCES IN MANAGED CARE
PLANS
A. Design Issues
1. The definition of the appealable event
Traditionally in administrative law analysis, rights, and rem-
edies flow from definitive events. From a design perspective,
problems emerge when legal rights are not grounded in defined
events, that is, the claim. In HMOs and managed care plans, as
opposed to traditional fee-for-service plans, services are not paid
for on an individual basis and thus there are no specific
"claims" presented to payors for payment for services.
What is the appealable event, if it is not a claim? What is
the appropriate appealable event when an HMO or other prepaid
managed care plan terminates or does not provide requested ser-
vices? To the extent that the appealable event becomes a medical
decision independent of payment for services, how is it distin-
guished from malpractice? The issue of the appealable event is
one of the most difficult to address in designing grievance proce-
dures under managed care plans. It is noteworthy that this
proved to be an especially confounding issue for consumer
groups in the recent debate over health care reform.50
50. See Kinney, supra note 23, at 131-32.
Winter 1996]
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The crucial problem is how to identify an appealable event,
given the reality of a medical practice that requires physicians to
choose among an array of treatment modalities for various medi-
cal problems. Conceivably, every decision that a physician makes
could constitute an appealable event. Clearly such an eventuality
would impede the frank and open physician-patient relationship
required for a sound therapeutic environment. At what point do
determinations of medical appropriateness or necessity merge
with clinical decision-making? For example, a physician may de-
cide that, although a service is covered, it is not medically neces-
sary or appropriate for a given patient. In a capitated system, in-
centives exist for physicians to make clinical judgments that
limit the provision of covered benefits and these incentives could
encourage physicians to find services unnecessary or
inappropriate.
This issue is compounded when a health plan makes a cor-
porate policy decision, presumably to be more competitive from
a cost perspective, to define medical necessity for particular con-
ditions at levels less than is customarily provided under current
practice. Such policies would presumably be based on clinical
practice guidelines and be accompanied by efforts to get plan
subscribers to agree by contract to accept the medical practice
guideline as the applicable standard of care for malpractice
purposes.
There are some models in the current appeal procedures for
Medicare HMOs that could serve to define triggers for appeals.
Specifically, Medicare uses an initial determination concept that
activates grievances and appeals in Medicare HMOs. 51 The
Medicare statute requires Medicare HMOs to "provide meaning-
ful procedures" for hearing and resolving consumer grievances. 52
A Medicare enrollee who is "dissatisfied by reason of his failure
to receive any health service to which he believes he is entitled
and at no greater charge than he believes he is required to pay"
has a right to administrative and judicial review under the Social
Security Act.53 However, only disputes that fall within the defini-
tion of an "organizational determination" are eligible for admin-
.istrative and judicial review. These determinations are HMO de-
51. See Kinney, supra note 23, at 100-01.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(c)(5)(A) (1994).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(c)(5)(B).
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cisions to deny access to treatment within the HMO, deny
authorization for an outside referral for covered services, or deny
payment for emergency, urgent, or other care provided outside
the HMO.5 4 All other issues, including disputes over quality, are
"grievances" to be handled in the HMO's internal grievance
procedure."
Another source of models for addressing this issue is the
comprehensive health care reform proposals introduced in the
103d Congress.5 6 In President Clinton's proposal, claims were the
events that triggered appeals and were defined as "claims for
payment or provision of services. . . ." or "a request for
preauthorization of items or services" submitted to a health
plan. 57 Senator Mitchell's compromise bill included an additional
provision that expanded the definition of appealable event to en-
compass the "denial, reduction or termination of any service or a
request for a referral or reimbursement. '5 8
2. Grievance Procedures
Health plans need grievance procedures to handle com-
plaints of individual consumers. The grievance process should
commence with an informal meeting led by responsible plan per-
sonnel with authority to make the requisite decisions to correct
mistakes or obtain medical or other information that could re-
solve the dispute. In this meeting, the plan representative should
try to resolve the dispute and advise the consumer of future steps
in the appeals process. The health plan should provide the con-
sumer with a written decision and notice of further appeal steps.
Should there be an appeal procedure from the plan griev-
ance procedure at all and, if so, what types of issues should be
eligible for further process? For example, as noted above, the
Medicare HMO appeal procedures do distinguish between issues
that are eligible for more formal process, such as administrative
54. 42 C.ER. § 417.606(a) (1994). See Stayn, supra note 27, at 1691.
55. 42 C.F.R. § 417.600 (1994) (defining organization determinations). See Stayn,
supra note 27, at 1691.
56. See generally Timothy S. Jost, Administrative Adjudication Under Health Care Re-
form, 47 ADmiN. L REv. 425 (1995) (discussing administrative adjudication issues raised in
proposals by the 103d Congress).
57. H.R. 3600, The Health Security Act of 1993, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5201(a)(1)
(1993). See Kinney, supra note 23, at 127.
58. S. 2560, Health Security Act, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5501 (1994). See Kinney,
supra note 23, at 128.
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and judicial review, and a simple grievance procedure at the
HMO level.5 9
If more formal process is appropriate, it is not clear that one
particular model of dispute resolution, such as mediation or arbi-
tration, is inherently more effective than another mode, such as a
traditional administrative hearing. It is interesting to note that
President Clinton's health care reform proposal called for a
choice of approaches, including alternative dispute resolution,
traditional administrative review, or judicial lawsuit, following a
grievance procedure, presumably to give consumers a choice of
procedural routes to pursue relief.60
Any procedure is appropriate provided that certain procedu-
ral elements are present. There are four key elements. First, there
should be timely notice that appealable events have occurred and
of the procedures for appeal. This includes notice of applicable
medical practice guidelines that govern coverage of services
under the plan.
Second, there should be prompt decisions by a knowledgea-
ble, unbiased decision maker. In any adjudication system, speed
and expertise in the decision-making process are key to provid-
ing genuine relief.
Third, large areas for the exercise of discretion should be
accorded to the decision maker. While this may be counter intui-
tive, decision makers need to have the latitude to provide satis-
factory relief to a patient, if appropriate. Hard and fast rules not
only impose constraints on the clinical decision making of physi-
cians within the plan, but also on decision makers resolving dis-
putes and seeking to protect the legitimate interests of patients in
receiving quality care.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, there should be meth-
ods for empowering patients in the grievance process. This is a
troubling issue given the inherent disparity in power and exper-
tise between patients and plans. A grievance procedure should be
informal and comprehensible enough so that grievances can be
negotiated by the patient individually. However, a patient should
have the option to be represented by counsel or other types of
representative in order that their cases be presented effectively.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(c)(5)(B) (1994).
60. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 5201-5243 (1993). See Kinney, supra note 23,
at 127-28.
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A crucial issue with respect to alternative dispute resolution
procedures such as mediation or arbitration is the degree to
which patients are genuinely situated to use these procedures ef-
fectively to protect their interests vis-d-vis the health plan. Alter-
native dispute resolution procedures in lieu of court proceedings
that are imposed on patients as a matter of contract upon enroll-
ment in the plan are especially suspect as they, by definition,
eliminate a range of judicial protections with which patients are
presumably familiar. Alternative dispute resolution procedures
also compromise the interest of patients if they either limit the
patient's rights to obtain relief under prevailing common law le-
gal theories or they impose procedures, such as limits on repre-
sentation by counsel, that disadvantage the patient procedurally.
3. Judicial Review
A central issue is the degree to which consumers and prov-
iders may challenge decisions and policies of a health plan in
state or federal court. To many consumers and providers, judicial
review is perceived as the ultimate forum for assuring accounta-
bility of government or corporate actors. Further, courts have
played a strong role in protecting rights of consumers with re-
spect to government entitlement programs in the past.61 We
would not do badly to leave current remedies, such as the right
to sue state personnel for violations of the Federal Constitution
under Section 198362 in place.63 Clearly, however, some modifi-
cation of ERISA limits on common law remedies to recover in
tort would be appropriate.
B. Strategies for Avoiding Grievances
This Article closes with some suggestions for avoiding
grievances altogether-an approach that best serves the interest
of patients. First, support the physician's traditional, best role as
advocate for the patient in the development of coverage policy
for the plan and give plan physicians authority to make coverage
policy through a credible process. Patients are more likely to
61. See generally Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Courts, Health Care Reform, and the Re-
construction of American Social Legislation, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 439 (1993) (de-
fending the court's rights-enforcing role in health care reform).
62. Civil Rights Act of 1871 § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
63. See Kinney, supra note 23, at 104-08.
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support a scientifically based coverage policy that their physi-
cians support even if it results in denials of care. Second, pro-
vide patients with comprehensible information about plan bene-
fits and coverage policy. In doing this, they will not surprised
when a denial of care occurs and will be less likely to object to
that denial.
Third, give particular attention to the problem of caring for
the chronically ill. This population will have many encounters
with plans, is knowledgeable about available and new treatments,
and is generally motivated to seek good care. Finally, health
plans should be sure to provide high quality care. While this ad-
vice may seem self-evident, it is crucial. In the final analysis,
grievances and disputes of whatever nature will be avoided if the
health plans provide high quality care.
The case of diabetes is instructive of how following these
principles could avoid patient grievances. Recently, a ten-year
clinical trial funded by the National Institutes of Health demon-
strated quite definitively that aggressive regulation of blood sugar
- a costly endeavor - prevents the devastating and costly com-
plications of diabetes that can develop in the years following di-
agnosis. 64 Yet, this treatment may not be cost-effective for a
health plan that only has responsibility for a patient for a few
years and probably will not experience the benefits of reducing
the high medical expenditures associated with caring for the
complications of diabetes that generally follow many years later.
Only health plans with a commitment to the long-term welfare of
the patient and the ability to meet this commitment in a competi-
tive health care environment will be able to benefit from provid-
ing this high level care for patients with diabetes. The situation
is no doubt similar to other chronic diseases, and there is evi-
dence that managed care plans to date have fallen short in pro-
viding high quality care for the chronically ill.65
Application of these four principles to avoid grievances by
patients regarding treatment for their diabetes might play out as
64. The Diabetes Control and Complications Trial Research Group, The Effect of Inten-
sive Treatment of Diabetes on the Development and Progression of Long-Term Complications
in Insulin-Dependent Diabetes Mellitus, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 977 (1993) (describing the
beneficial effects of rigorous treatments for diabetes).
65. See, e.g., Teresa Fama et al., Do HMOs Care for the Chronically Ill?, HALTH
AFF., Spring 1995, at 234; Alan L. Hillman et al., How Do Financial Incentives Affect Physi-
cians' Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions, 321 NEw ENG. J. MEo. 86 (1989).
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follows. Plan physicians should formally consider the best medi-
cal evidence regarding the treatment of diabetes including extant
medical practice guidelines or other standards that address the
treatment of diabetes. 66 Plan physicians might affirmatively adopt
guidelines with which they agree as a matter of plan policy and
make this policy available to potential enrollees. Plans would
then aggressively support plan physicians as they follow these
guidelines and generally provide high quality care to patients
with diabetes. By following these principles, plans would inevita-
bly provide higher quality care which would satisfy diabetic pa-
tients receiving the care. Informed patients would be assured that
the care comported with the state of the art of medical practice
in the field. Satisfied patients who know that they have been ac-
corded care meets the scientifically based guidelines are clearly
less likely to have a grievance about the care they received.
VI. CONCLUSION
Resolving grievances after the fact-which always has been
an unsatisfactory approach-may also prove especially deleteri-
ous in a managed care environment. The greatest hope for pro-
tecting consumers lies in the avoidance of grievances and dis-
putes in the first instance. While this principle is always true, it
is especially true in a managed care context. However, achieving
this goal may be difficult to accomplish in an era of frenetic cost
cutting and industry shake-down. Consequently, having fair pro-
cedures iii place that accommodate the realities of delivering care
in managed care settings is essential. Fair procedures that em-
power patients are also crucially important in today's health care
system where so many forces are at work to disempower con-
sumers in the health care context and society generally.
66. Charles M. Clark & Eleanor D. Kinney, Standards for the Care of Diabetes: Ori-
gins, Uses and Implications for Third-Party Payment, 15 DIABETES CARE 10 (Supp. 1992)
(discussing the extant medical practice guidelines regarding the treatment of diabetes).
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